Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
Economic Research Institute Study Papers

Economics and Finance

2-1-1984

Setting Utility Prices: Appropriate Power Costs for Utah Irrigation
Pumpers
Jay C. Andersen
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri

Recommended Citation
Andersen, Jay C., "Setting Utility Prices: Appropriate Power Costs for Utah Irrigation Pumpers" (1984).
Economic Research Institute Study Papers. Paper 402.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/eri/402

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Economics and Finance at DigitalCommons@USU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Economic Research
Institute Study Papers by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

February 1984

Study Paper #84-5

SETTING UTILITY PRICES: APPROPRIATE POWER
COSTS FOR UTAH IRRIGATION PUMPERS
By
Jay C. Andersen

SETTING UTLLITY PRICES:

APPROPRIATE POWER COSTS FOR

UTAH IRRIGATION PUKPERS

By
Jay C. Andersen
Department of Economics
Utah State University
Logan, UT 84322

February 1984

. 1

SETTING UTILITY PRICES:

APPROPRIATE POVER COSTS FOR

UTAH IRRIGATION PUMPERS
Much has been said and written on efficient and equitable pricing
of public utility products, yet utility users are often charged prices
which bear little resemblance to actual costs of providing services or
to other criteria established.

Among causes is the hectic schedule of

the public utili ties governing body which is continually bombarded by
rate requests and other matters.

The adversial nature of utility vs.

users and the contesting users arguments in the spread of rates do not
lend themselves to discovery of efficient and equitable

pri~es.

Over-

capacity in electrical generating facilities which increases costs has
mostly occurred because of projecting ever-increasing loads at peak
capacity use hours, days, and years.

Little or no att .e ntion has been

given to the possibility of load management by pricing differentials or
other incentives.
Functions of Utility Prices
Prices charged for utilities have various functions.

The Division

of Public Utilities of the Utah Department of Public Utilities has
adopted appropriate rate design pricing objecti ves.

They are given by'

Compton (1983) as follows:
1.

Revenue adequacy.

Rates to each user class should be con-

structed to yield the prescribed revenues, given the projected
leve 1 of sa lese

2.

Alloca ti ve efficiency.

Prices should be neither too low nor

too high relative to costs since such leads

to excessive or
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insufficient utilization of a particular resource.

Ancillary

objectives (are) understandability and stability over time.

3.

Distributional equity.

should be minimized.

Intraschedule cross-subsidization

The revenue standard by which customer bil-

lings are evaluated is that which would result from the competitive
supply of the good/service.

For one customer within a schedule to

pay that level while others pay substantially less (or more) would
be inappropriate.
4.

Net revenue stability.

A utility's capital costs are lower

when the impact of sales

volatility upon profits is not

exaggerated.
Until

recently,

the rates .established for irrigation pumpers and

probably for most other classes of users met none of these objectives
except for overa 11 revenue adequacy for the uti 1 i ty.
After much negotiating with the irrigation pumpers and several
appearances before the Pub 1 ic Serv ice Commission (Andersen 1978,

1980,

1981, 1982, and 1983) and wi th coopera tion of the Division of Publ ic

Utilities,

Department of Business Regulation, State of Utah, and ulti-

mate cooperation of Utah Power and Light, a new set of rate options. for
the UP & L service area in Utah was adopted for the 1984 irrigation
season.

Four options are now available to farmers from which they must

choose an option for each pump installation by October 15 prior to the
year of irrigation.
Rate A:

The following four rate alternatives are available:

Nonparticipation in load control or time-of-day options.

This

is a traditional declining block schedule with high start-up
or demand charges that has been in use for years.

Ra te B:

Participation in load control in which a pump may be shut d6wn
by automatic controls between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. on one
weekday per week which the pumper chooses.

He may choose, for

example, to be subject to shutdown for up to twelve hours each
Tuesday during the irrigation season.
Nay 25 to September 15.

The rate has a slightly lower demand

charge, but the same declining block
Rate C:

The season extends from

ene~gy

rates as Rate A.

Participation in load control in which a pump may be shut down
any weekday during the calendar week for up to twel ve hours
per week providing that Utah Power and Light will not shut
down"a pump more than three times in any given

wee~

The rate

is the same as Rate B but with a lower demand charge.
Rate D:

Agreement to accept billing for different rates for power used
d uri n g d iff ere n t per i 0 d s
higher price than off-peak.

0

f the day.

0 n - pea k usa g e i "s a t a

Meters will record on-peak usage

from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, except
holidays.

Shoulder rates will apply from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00

a.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Monday through Friday,
except holidays, and from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. on Saturday.
Off-peak will be all other usage.

Off-season use is priced at

less than half that charged in the other three rates.
Pumpers have options now provided they are willing and able

~o

cope

with inconveniences and trouble of load management or time-of-use pricing.

They may save from a small percentage to more than half of their

pumping bill.

Hany of the changes that pumpers could use are dependent
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on careful evaluation of capital and labor investments . to make new rate
structures work.

stability of the system will be critical so that the

program can be fully adopted.
Evaluation of Past and Present Rate Structures
Utah irrigation pumpers had complained of serious adverse impacts
from rates in the past and from proposed increases.

Mostly, the com-

plaints kept rates from rising as rapidly as they otherwise would have
done.

-

~ >:

.'".

But, the basic contention of Utah Power and Light Company, the

utility serving most Utah irrigation pumpers,

was that rates needed to

.

.

be raised dramatically relative to other user classes.

The basis of the

rate requests made it evident that little attention had been given to
the basic objectives of rate design previously listed.

Turn now to

evaluation of the old pricing system in regard to each of the rate
design objectives and some of the advantages of the new rate structure .
.. "::-

An interesting background factor is that
trieal home heating and other factors caused
load to be in win ter.

~~

U~ah

the early 1970s elecPower and Light's peak

In order to equalize loads, Utah Power promoted

electrical irrigation pumping and promised inexpensive power to promote
summer use.

Attractive rates induced large investments in land and.

irrigation equipment.

Utah Power and Light failed to foresee the bur-

geoning use of air conditioning and other factors which have now caused
the summer peak system loads to be
winter.

approximatel.:~·

With a succession of rate increases,

pumpers have quadrupled in less than a decade

5 percent greater than

power rates to irrigation
P.S

~easures

responsibility have been used to justify increases.

of peak load

Pumpers are going

bankrupt at an alarming rate where they are on new developments.
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Operating costs are exceeding income and real estate values are
ing much more rapidly than for most farm rp.al estate.

declin~

There is an

equity and an efficiency problem of having been invited to invest and
then experiencing almost an immediate change in rate levels and
philosophy which renders the investments unprofitable.
In "regard to revenue adequacy, several hearings had been held in
which it was contended that pumpers were
share of revenue requirements.

pay~ng

far less than their

In several hearings it was suggested by

the uti 1 i ty tha t the pumpers' ra tes be essen tia ly doub led.

The basis

for these suggestions was the company's cost of service calculations in
which they based the allocation of costs on the average and excess
demand method measured on twelve-month noncoincident peaks.
Efficiency criteria are being violated in the applications of the
"average and excess demand" method of cost allocation, especially using
the company's preferred twel ve-month noncoincident peak method.
cuI ture was hit hard.

Agri-

The formula f ':>r the average and excess demand

calculation for cost of service payment responsibility is:
Kw

R

Pkw

i

(LF) +

n
E tCWj
j=1
where

R =
Kwi

i -

n
E (Pkwj
j=1

Kw

i

(1

-

LF)

Kw .)
J

proportional responsibility for covering costs
average kilowatts used by the ith user class (e.g.,
irrigation) during the period of

Kwj

record

average kilowatts used by other user classes
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LF

load factor or average proportion of use of the system
capacity

Pkw i

peak use

0

f

the

i th

use r class a t a 15-minu te

period (Utah Power and Light's preferred methodology
was to measure this when class use was highest in each
month even if system use was low.)

The mandated

methodology is, as of this year, the eight-month coincidental peak method.
Pkw.

J

=

peak use of each of the other user classes.

This method allocates cost of service on the proportion of total
s y s t e m de man d (t h e fir s t h a I f

0

f the rig h t - han d sid e

0

f t h.e e qua t ion)

which is the average use by the class as compared to total use and by
the penalty in the excess part in the second half of the equation if the
class peak to average difference is greater than other peak to average
differences.

An obvious problem with this system is that if a class of

service is highly variable but countercyclical, such as would be the
case on a daily basis with street lighting or recreation park lighting,
a rate penalty is imposed whereas a credit for smoothing the utility's
load curve should be received.

See the typical dailj firm load curve of

Utah Power and Light in Figure
than the summer/fall difference.
summer afternoon system peak.
measurements for several pumpers.

which shows daily differences greater
Pumpers have a tendency to avoid the
See Figures 2 and 3 which are sample
This pattern is related to afternoon

winds and heat which cause uneven distribution of water by sprinkler$
and by high evaporation.

Samples of daily load patterns for irrigators
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FIGURE 2. Oed 1)' Load Pa t tern

FIGURE 3. Daily Load Pattern

for a Sample of Utah Pumpers

for Average Weekdays of the

on July 5, 1981 (system peak

Month for a Sample of Utah

for 1981 occurred on this day

Pumpers, August 1978

at the hour ending at 2:00 pm)
SOllHCE:

A. H. Ihlllll.

p)R2.

Test.imony b('f~'rc t.he Pub 'l ic Service Commission.

Case No. 81-03S-I.). November.

indica te a frequent midnight peak use.

Bu t

they ha ve been charged f6 r

this lack of uniformity in load rather than rewarded.
Part of the problems of revenue adequacy by class have now been
corrected in which the "average and excess demand" allocation method is
still used,

but it is based on an eight-month coincident peak in which

the penalties are only imposed on the basis of proportionate use and
relative peak when the monthly system peak is occurring.

Further parity

is gained by discarding spring and fall months of low use so that only
. .. .

the relevant peaks in summer and winter are used.

Pumpers have been

given load management options for reducing peak daytime use for a price
incen ti ve as we 11 as time-o f -day ra tes in which nighttime

an~

weekend

rates are about one-third of the peak-hour rates These rates have been
established on the basis of expected cost savings to the utility for
supplying energy.

Further reductions in pumping rates based on reduced

capacity needs should result as adoption of the rates becomes widespread
and is reflected in the cost-of-service calculations.
Now, relative to allocative efficiency, it is evident from the
previous

d~scussion

that

various sectors were not being charged rates

commensurate with costs being imposed on the utility.

There was no

a ttempt to maximize economic benefi ts by charging a price equa 1 to the
cost of supplying an extra unit of electricity (marginal cost pricing).
A declining block tariff was used with a very substantial hook-up or
demand charge.

Thus, the incentive was to use the last increment of

power (because it was inexpensive) in each monthly billing period.

The

appropriate goal is for a uniform system load.
tioning and lighting,

many industrial uses,

Commercial air condi-

and even some residential

uses are somewhat inflexible in time and season of use.
classes more flexibility may occur.
elasticities are higher.
ginal costs of power use,
with the tariff.

In other

Incentives can be used where demand

The irrigator can now closely calculate marinvestment and operating costs in accordance

Adherence to marginal principles of resource alloca-

tion is much closer than was formerly possible, even though much could
yet be done.

The time-of-day rate allows least expensive power to be

used first rather than most expensive.

The time-of-day rate is, in

effect, an increasing block rate if used appropriately.

Fortunately,

the time-of-day rates also provide for very inexpensive pre- and postseason rates to induce irrigators to fill the soil profile when system
electrical use is down substantially.

Sizing of equipment,

amount of

irrigation, crop combinations, and improvements in efficiency of systems
will likely occur over an extended period of time in response to opportunities for efficiency improvement in pricing.
With regard to distributional equity, it is apparent that some
pumpers who used e lectrici ty on ly in daytime and others who irrigated
only at night or who pumped continuously have not been treated equitably
in cost differentials.

In Utah, over one-half of the farmers have small

farms and are engaged in off-farm employment.
quite frequently invested in irrigation

As a result, they have

equipme~t

and other implements

that are somewhat underutilized according to most evaluations of equipment size.

The irrigation sector has a load factor of 0.62 (Faigle

1983) during the irrigation season.

This indicates an average use of 62

10

percent of potential use for one-third of the year.

This relatively low

load factor during the irrigation season along with numerous indications
of -relatively elastic demand for irrigation water (especially precise
timing of its .use) suggest that much will be done to adjust use to
relate to differential costs.

Thus, those who can move to off-peak will

do so and those who must pump on-peak will do so while -paying the
appropriate costs on the system.

Very high demand charges have been

assessed for starting up a pump no matter whether any use was on-peak or

,

:

not.

These can now be partially avoided and far more fairness among

pumpers is prov ided.
On revenue stability, there are indications that carefully calculated cost-based rates have a better chance of long-term constancy
than those which are based on adversial negoti.ations and power moves.
Cycles of overexpansion and underdevelopment of generating capacity and
bursting balloons of inappropriate investments on the part of utility
users may be expected to diminish.

In retrospect, it is easy to visual-

ize immense savings to the utility if demand projections had been based
on more accurate reflection of power costs to users.
more conservation would have been exerci.sed on

:~e

Conversely, far

part of irrigators if

actual cost indications had been transmitted to them at the time of
investment decisions.

Unquestionably,

the winter peak phenomenon that

existed for a while was blown out of proportio:1 in the rate structure.
Both utility and irrigators would have been better served by cost-based
rates.

11

References
Andersen~

Jay C.

of Utah.
Andersen~

1983.

~ase

Compton, George R.

Salt Lake City; Utah.

August.

Salt Lake City, Utah.

March.

Testimony before the Publie Service Commission
Salt Lake City, Utah.

November.

Testimony before the Public Service Commission

No. 82-035-06.
1983.

mission of Utah.

September.

Testimony before the Public Service Commission

Case No. 81-035-13.

Andersen, Jay C.
of Utah.

1981.

1982.

Salt Lake City, Utah.

Testimony before the Public Service Commission

Case No. 80-035-17.

Andersen, Jay C.
of Utah.

1980.

Case No. 79~035~12.

Andersen; Jay C.
of Utah.

Testimony before the Public Service Commission

Case No. 78~035~14.

Jay C.

of Utah.

1978.

Salt Lake City, Utah.

October.

Testimony before the Public Service Com-

Case No. 82-035-13.

Salt Lake City,

Utah.

September.
Faigle,

Shelley R.

sion of Utah.
September.

1983.

Testimony before the Public Service Commis-

Case No. 82-035-13.

Sal t

Lake City, .Utah.

